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Abstract. Dynamic searchable symmetric encryption (DSSE) is a use-
ful cryptographic tool in encrypted cloud storage. However, it has been
reported that DSSE usually suffers from file-injection attacks and con-
tent leak of deleted documents. To mitigate these attacks, forward pri-
vacy and backward privacy have been proposed. Nevertheless, the ex-
isting forward/backward-private DSSE schemes can only support single
keyword queries. To address this problem, in this paper, we propose
two DSSE schemes supporting range queries. One is forward-private and
supports a large number of documents. The other can achieve backward
privacy, while it can only support a limited number of documents. Fi-
nally, we also give the security proofs of the proposed DSSE schemes in
the random oracle model.
Keywords: Dynamic searchable symmetric encryption · Forward pri-
vacy · Backward privacy · Range queries
1 Introduction
Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) is a useful cryptographic primitive that
can encrypt the data to protect its confidentiality while keeping its searchability.
Dynamic SSE (DSSE) further provides data dynamics that allows the client to
update data over the time without losing data confidentiality and searchability.
Due to this property, DSSE is highly demanded in encrypted cloud. However,
many existing DSSE schemes [14,8] suffer from file-injection attacks [7,22], where
the adversary can compromise the privacy of a client query by injecting a small
portion of new documents to the encrypted database. To resist this attack, Zhang
et al. [22] highlighted the need of forward privacy that was informally introduced
by Stefanov et al. [19]. The formal definition of forward privacy for DSSE was
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2given by Bost [5] who also proposed a concrete forward-private DSSE scheme.
Furthermore, Bost et al. [6] demonstrated the damage of content leak of deleted
documents and proposed the corresponding security notionbackward privacy.
Several backward-private DSSE schemes were also presented in [6].
Nevertheless, the existing forward/backward-private DSSE schemes only sup-
port single keyword queries, which are not expressive enough in data search ser-
vice [13,12]. To solve this problem, we aim to design forward/backward-private
DSSE schemes supporting range queries. Our design starts from the regular bi-
nary tree in [13] to support range queries. However, the binary tree in [13] cannot
be applied directly to the dynamic setting. It is mainly because that the key-
words in [13] are labelled according to the corresponding tree levels that will
change significantly in the dynamic setting. A na¨ıve solution is to replace all
old keywords by the associated new keywords. This is, however, not efficient. To
address this problem, we have to explore new approaches for our goal.
Our Contributions. To achieve the above goal, we propose two new DSSE
constructions supporting range queries in this paper. The first one is forward-
private but with a larger client overhead in contrast to [13]. The second one is
backward-private DSSE which greatly reduces the client and the server storage
at the cost of losing forward privacy. In more details, our main contributions are
as follows:
– To make the binary tree suitable for range queries in the dynamic setting,
we introduce a new binary tree data structure, and then present the first
forward-private DSSE supporting range queries by applying it to Bost’s
scheme [5]. However, the forward privacy is achieved at the expense of suf-
fering from a large storage overhead on the client side.
– To achieve backward privacy, we apply the Paillier cryptosystem and the
bit string representation to Bost’s framework. To reduce the storage at both
the client and server side, we used a fixed update token for each keyword.
Note that, this scheme is not forward-private, since, for every update, the
server knows which keyword has been updated. We refer readers to Section 4
for more details. Notably, due to the limitation of the Paillier cryptosystem,
it cannot support large-scale database consisting a large number of docu-
ments. Nevertheless, it suits well for certain scenarios where the number of
documents is moderate. The new approach may give new lights on designing
more efficient and secure DSSE schemes.
– Also, the comparison with related works in Table 1 and detailed security
analyses are provided, which demonstrate that our constructions are not
only forward/backward-private but also with a comparable efficiency.
Remark: In this full version, we correct the wrong theorem (cf. Theorem 2) in
the conference version [24], where we claimed that the second construction can
achieve forward privacy. In fact, the forward privacy cannot be achieved, because
the update can be linked to previous searches by the fixed token. In particular,
we focus on achieving backward privacy by applying the Paillier cryptosystem
and the bit string representation to Bost [5]’s framework, which can also achieve
3forward privacy due to Bost’s technique. For every update on keyword n, how-
ever, the server needs to store a ciphertext (of Paillier encryption) corresponding
to n. In addition, the number of keywords is nearly doubled compared to the
scheme of [5], as mentioned in our first construction. Then this construction
incurs large storage on both the server and the client side. In the conference
version, we used a fixed update token for each keyword to further reduce the
storage overhead. By this way, the server can homomorphicly add the ciphertext
to the previous ones corresponding to the same keyword, and the client does
not need to store the current search token yet. Therefore, both the client and
the server storage are reduced a lot, but at the cost of losing forward privacy.
Nevertheless, we made some mistake when preparing the conference version and
so we correct it here.
Table 1: Comparison with existing DSSE schemes
Scheme
Client Computation Client Range Forward Backward Document
Search Update Storage Queries Privacy Privacy number
[13] wR - O(1) 3 7 7 large
[5] - O(1) O(W ) 7 3 7 large
Ours A wR dlog(W )e+ 1 O(2W ) 3 3 7 large
Ours B wR dlog(W )e+ 1 O(1) 3 7 3 small
W is the number of keywords in a database, wR is the number of keywords for
a range query(we map a range query to a few different keywords).
1.1 Related Works
Song et al. [18] were the first using symmetric encryption to facilitate keyword
search over the encrypted data. Later, Curtmola et al. [11] gave a formal defini-
tion for SSE and the corresponding security model in the static setting. To make
SSE more scalable and expressive, Cash et al. [9] proposed a new scalable SSE
supporting Boolean queries. Following this construction, many extensions have
been proposed. Faber et al. [13] extended it to process a much richer collection
of queries. For instance, they used a binary tree with keywords labelled accord-
ing to the tree levels to support range queries. Zuo et al. [23] made another
extension to support general Boolean queries. Cash et al.’s construction has also
been extended into multi-user setting [20,15,21]. However, the above schemes
cannot support data update. To solve this problem, some DSSE schemes have
been proposed [14,8].
However, designing a secure DSSE scheme is not an easy job. Cash et al.
[7] pointed out that only a small leakage leveraged by the adversary would be
enough to compromise the privacy of clients’ queries. A concrete attack named
file-injection attack was proposed by Zhang et al. [22]. In this attack, the adver-
sary can infer the concept of aclient queries by injecting a small portion of new
4documents into encrypted database. This attack also highlights the need for for-
ward privacy which protects security of new added parts. Accordingly, we have
backward privacy that protects security of new added parts and later deleted.
These two security notions were first introduced by Stefanov et al.[19]. The for-
mal definitions of forward/backward privacy for DSSE were given by Bost [5] and
Bost et al. [6], respectively. In [5], Bost also proposed a concrete forward-private
DSSE scheme, it does not support physical deletion. Later on, Kim et al. [16] pro-
posed a forward-private DSSE scheme supporting physical deletion. Meanwhile,
Bost et al. [6] proposed a forward/backward-private DSSE to reduce leakage
during deletion. Unfortunately, all the existing forward/backward-private DSSE
schemes only support single keyword queries. Hence, forward/backward-private
DSSE supporting more expressive queries, such as range queries, are quite de-
sired.
Apart from the binary tree technique, order preserving encryption (OPE)
can also be used to support range queries. The concept of OPE was proposed
by Agrawal et al. [1], and it allows the order of the plaintexts to be preserved in
the ciphertexts. It is easy to see that this kind of encryption would lead to the
leakage in [2,3]. To reduce this leakage, Boneh et al. [4] proposed another concept
named order revealing encryption (ORE), where the order of the ciphertexts are
revealed by using an algorithm rather than comparing the ciphertexts (in OPE)
directly. More efficient ORE schemes were proposed later [10]. However, ORE-
based SSE still leaks much information about the underlying plaintexts. To avoid
this, in this paper, we focus on how to use the binary tree structure to achieve
range queries.
1.2 Organization
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we give
the background information and building blocks that are used in this paper. In
Sect. 3, we give the definition of DSSE and its security definition. After that
in Sect. 4, we present a new binary tree and our DSSE schemes. Their security
analyses are given in Sect. 5. Finally, Sect. 6 concludes this work.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we describe cryptographic primitives (building blocks) that are
used in this work.
2.1 Trapdoor Permutations
A trapdoor permutation (TDP) Π is a one-way permutation over a domain D
such that (1) it is “easy” to compute Π for any value of the domain with the
public key, and (2) it is “easy” to calculate the inverse Π−1 for any value of a
co-domainM only if a matching secret key is known. More formally, Π consists
of the following algorithms:
5– TKeyGen(1λ) → (TPK,TSK): For a security parameter 1λ, the algorithm re-
turns a pair of cryptographic keys: a public key TPK and a secret key TSK.
– Π(TPK, x)→ y: For a pair: public key TPK and x ∈ D, the algorithm outputs
y ∈M.
– Π−1(TSK, y) → x: For a pair: a secret key TSK and y ∈ M, the algorithm
returns x ∈ D.
One-wayness. We say Π is one-way if for any probabilistic polynomial time
(PPT) adversary A, an advantage
AdvOWΠ,A(1
λ) = Pr[x← A(TPK, y)]
is negligible, where (TSK, TPK)← TKeyGen(1λ), y ← Π(TPK, x), x ∈ D.
2.2 Paillier Cryptosystem
A Paillier cryptosystem Σ = (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) is defined by following three
algorithms:
– KeyGen(1λ)→ (PK,SK): It chooses at random two primes p and q of similar
lengths and computes n = pq and φ(n) = (p−1)(q−1). Next it sets g = n+1,
β = φ(n) and µ = φ(n)−1 mod n. It returns PK = (n, g) and SK = (β, µ).
– Enc(PK,m) → c: Let m be the message, where 0 ≤ m < n, the algorithm
selects an integer r at random from Zn and computes a ciphertext c = gm ·rn
mod n2.
– Dec(SK, c) → m: The algorithm calculates m = L(cβ mod n2) · µ mod n,
where L(x) = x−1n .
Semantically Security. We say Σ is semantically secure if for any probabilistic
polynomial time (PPT) adversary A, an advantage
AdvIND-CPAΣ,A (1
λ) = |Pr[A(Enc(PK,m0)) = 1]− Pr[A(Enc(PK,m1)) = 1]|
is negligible, where (SK, PK)← KeyGen(1λ), A chooses m0, m1 and |m0| = |m1|.
Homomorphic Addition. Paillier cryptosystem is homomorphic, i.e.
Dec(Enc(m1) · Enc(m2)) mod n2 = m1 +m2 mod n.
In our second construction, we need this property to achieve backward privacy.
2.3 Notations
The list of notations used is given in Table 2.
6Table 2: Notations (used in our constructions)
W The number of keywords in a database DB
BDB The binary database which is constructed from a database DB by using our
binary tree BT
m The number of values in the range [0,m− 1] for our range queries
v A value in the range [0,m− 1] where 0 ≤ v < m
ni The i-th node in our binary tree which is considered as the keyword
rooto The root node of the binary tree before update
rootn The root node of the binary tree after update
STc The current search token for a node n
M A random value for ST0 which is the first search token for a node n
UTc The current update token for a node n
T A map which is used to store the encrypted database EDB
N A map which is used to store the current search token for ni
NSet The node set which contains the nodes
TPK The public key of trapdoor permutation
TSK The secret key of trapdoor permutation
PK The public key of Paillier cryptosystem
SK The secret key of Paillier cryptosystem
fi The i-th file
PBT Perfect binary tree
CBT Complete binary tree
VBT Virtual perfect binary tree
ABT Assigned complete binary tree
3 Dynamic Searchable Symmetric Encryption (DSSE)
We follow the database model given in the paper [5]. A database is a collection
of (index, keyword set) pairs denoted as DB= (indi,Wi)
d
i=1, where indi ∈ {0, 1}`
and Wi ⊆ {0, 1}∗. The set of all keywords of the database DB is W = ∪di=1Wi,
where d is the number of documents in DB. We identify W = |W| as the total
number of keywords and N = Σdi=1|Wi| as the number of document/keyword
pairs. We denote DB(w) as the set of documents that contain a keyword w. To
achieve a sublinear search time, we encrypt the file indices of DB(w) correspond-
ing to the same keyword w (a.k.a. inverted index5).
A DSSE scheme Γ consists of an algorithm Setup and two protocols Search
and Update as described below.
– (EDB, σ) ← Setup(DB, 1λ): For a security parameter 1λ and a database DB.
The algorithm outputs an encrypted database EDB for the server and a secret
state σ for the client.
– (I, ⊥) ← Search(q, σ, EDB): The protocol is executed between a client
(with her query q and state σ) and a server (with its EDB). At the end of
5 It is an index data structure where a word is mapped to a set of documents which
contain this word.
7the protocol, the client outputs a set of file indices I and the server outputs
nothing.
– (σ′, EDB′) ← Update(σ, op, in, EDB): The protocol runs between a client
and a server. The client input is a state σ, an operation op = (add, del)
she wants to perform and a collection of in = (ind,w) pairs that are going
to be modified, where add, del mean the addition and deletion of a doc-
ument/keyword pair, respectively, ind is the file index and w is a set of
keywords. The server input is EDB. Update returns an updated state σ′ to
the client and an updated encrypted database EDB′ to the server.
3.1 Security Definition
The security definition of DSSE is formulated using the following two games:
DSSEREALΓA(1
λ) and DSSEIDEALΓA,S(1
λ). The DSSEREALΓA(1
λ) is executed using
DSSE. The DSSEIDEALΓA,S(1
λ) is simulated using the leakage of DSSE. The leak-
age is parameterized by a function L = (LStp,LSrch,LUpdt), which describes
what information is leaked to the adversary A. If the adversary A cannot dis-
tinguish these two games, then we can say there is no other information leaked
except the information that can be inferred from the leakage function L. More
formally,
– DSSEREALΓA(1
λ): On input a database DB, which is chosen by the adversary
A, it outputs EDB by using Setup(1λ, DB) to the adversary A. A can re-
peatedly perform a search query q (or an update query (op, in)). The game
outputs the results generated by running Search(q) (or Update(op, in)) to
the adversary A. Eventually, A outputs a bit.
– DSSEIDEALΓA,S(1
λ): On input a database DB which is chosen by the adversary
A, it outputs EDB to the adversary A by using a simulator S(LStp(1λ, DB)).
Then, it simulates the results for the search query q by using the leakage
function S(LSrch(q)) and uses S(LUpdt(op, in)) to simulate the results for
update query (op, in). Eventually, A outputs a bit.
Definition 1. A DSSE scheme Γ is L-adaptively-secure if for every PPT ad-
versary A, there exists an efficient simulator S such that
|Pr[DSSEREALΓA(1λ) = 1]− Pr[DSSEIDEALΓA,S(1λ) = 1]| ≤ negl(1λ).
4 Constructions
In this section, we give two DSSE constructions. In order to process range queries,
we deploy a new binary tree which is modified from the binary tree in [13]. Now,
we first give our binary tree used in our constructions.
84.1 Binary Tree for Range Queries
In a binary tree BT, every node has at most two children named left and right.
If a node has a child, then there is an edge that connects these two nodes. The
node is the parent parent of its child. The root root of a binary tree does not
have parent and the leaf of a binary tree does not have any child. In this paper,
the binary tree is stored in thew form of linked structures. The first node of BT is
the root of a binary tree. For example, the root node of the binary tree BT is BT,
the left child of BT is BT.left, and the parent of BT’s left child is BT.left.parent,
where BT = BT.left.parent.
In a complete binary tree CBT, every level, except possibly the last, is com-
pletely filled, and all nodes in the last level are as far left as possible (the leaf
level may not full). A perfect binary tree PBT is a binary tree in which all internal
nodes (not the leaves) have two children and all leaves have the same depth or
same level. Note that, PBT is a special CBT.
4.2 Binary Database
In this paper, we use binary database BDB which is generated from DB. In DB,
keywords (the first row in 1.(c)) are used to retrieve the file indices (every column
in 1.(c)). For simplicity, we map keywords in DB to the values in the range [0,m−1]
for range queries6, where m is the maximum number of values. If we want to
search the range [0,3], a na¨ıve solution is to send every value in the range (0, 1,
2 and 3) to the server, which is not efficient. To reduce the number of keywords
sent to the server, we use the binary tree as shown in Fig. 1.(a). For the range
query [0,3], we simply send the keyword n3 (the minimum nodes to cover value
0, 1, 2 and 3) to the server. In BDB, every node in the binary tree is the keyword
of the binary database, and every node has all the file indices for its decedents,
as illustrated in Figure 1.(d).
As shown in Fig. 1.(a), keyword in BDB corresponding to node i (the black
integer) is ni (e.g. the keyword for node 0 is n0.). The blue integers are the
keywords in DB and are mapped to the values in the range [0,3]. These values are
associated with the leaves of our binary tree. The words in red are the file indices
in DB. For every node (keyword), it contains all the file indices in its descendant
leaves. Node n1 contains f0, f1, f2, f3 and there is no file in node n4 (See Fig.
1.(d)). For a range query [0, 2], we need to send the keywords n1, n4 (n1 and n4
are the minimum number of keywords to cover the range [0, 2].) to the server,
and the result file indices are f0, f1, f2 and f3.
Bit String Representation. We parse the file indices for every keyword in
BDB (e.g. every column in Figure 1.(d)) into a bit string, which we will use later.
Suppose there are y− 1 documents in our BDB, then we need y bits to represent
6 In different applications, we can choose different kinds of values. For instance, audit
documents of websites with particular IP addresses. We can search the whole network
domain, particular host or application range.
9the existence of these documents. The highest bit is the sign bit (0 means positive
and 1 means negative). If fi contains keyword nj , then the i-th bit of the bit
string for nj (every keyword has a bit string) is set to 1. Otherwise, it is set to 0.
For update, if we want to add a new file index fi (which also contains keyword
nj) to keyword nj , we need a positive bit string, where the i-th bit is set to 1 and
all other bits are set to 0. Next, we add this bit string to the existing bit string
associated with nj
7. Then, fi is added to the bit string for nj . If we want to
delete file index fi from the bit string for nj , we need a negative bit string (the
most significant bit is set to 1), the i-th bit is set to 1 and the remaining bits
are set to 0. Then, we need to get the complement of the bit string 8. Next, we
add the complement bit string as in the add operation. Finally, the fi is deleted
from the bit string for nj .
For example, in Fig. 1.(b), the bit string for n0 is 000001, and the bit string
for n4 is 000000. Assume that we want to delete file index f0 from n0 and
add it to n4. First we need to generate bit string 000001 and add it to the bit
string (000000) for n4. Next we generate the complement bit string 111111 (the
complement of 100001) and add it to 000001 for n0. Then, the result bit strings
for n0 and n4 are 000000 and 000001, respectively. As a result, the file index f0
has been moved from n0 to n4.
n0 n2
n1
n4 n6
n5
n3
0 1 2 3
(a)
(b)
f0 f1
f2
f3
f4
n0 n2
n1
n4 n6
n5
n3
0 1 2 3
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
(c)
values (keywords in DB)
nodes (keywords in BDB)
file indexes
values (keywords in DB)
nodes (keywords in BDB)
file indexes
(d)
n0 n1 n2 n3 n4 n5 n6
0 0 1 1 0 1 2 3 2 2 3 3
f0 f0 f0
f1 f1 f1
f2 f2 f2
f3 f3 f3
f4 f4 f4
0 1 2 3
f0
f1
f2
f3
f4
Fig. 1: Architecture of Our Binary Tree for Range Queries
7 Note that, in the range queries, the bit strings are bit exclusive since a file is corre-
sponded to one value only.
8 In a computer, the subtraction is achieved by adding the complement of the negative
bit string.
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Binary Tree Assignment and Update. As we use the binary tree to support
data structure needed in our DSSE, we define the following operations that are
necessary to manipulate the DSSE data structure.
TCon(m): For an integer m, the operation builds a complete binary tree CBT.
CBT has dlog(m)e+ 1 levels, where the root is on the level 0, and the leaves are
on the level dlog(m)e. All leaves are associated with the m consecutive integers
from left to right.
TAssign(CBT): The operation takes a CBT as an input and outputs an assigned
binary tree ABT, where nodes are labelled by appropriate integers. The opera-
tion applies TAssignSub recursively. Keywords then are assigned to the node
integers.
TAssignSub(c, CBT): For an input pair: a counter c and CBT, the operation
outputs an assigned binary tree. It is implemented as a recursive function. It
starts from 0 and assigns to nodes incrementally. See Fig. 2 for an example.
TGetNodes(n, ABT): For an input pair: a node n and a tree ABT, the operation
generates a collection of nodes in a path from the node n to the root node. This
operation is needed for our update algorithm if a client wants to add a file to a
leaf (a value in the range). The file is added to the leaf and its parent nodes.
TUpdate(add, v, CBT): The operation takes a value v and a complete binary
tree CBT and updates CBT so the tree contains the value v. For simplicity, we
consider the current complete binary tree contains values in the range [0, v−1]9.
Depending on the value of v, the operation is executed according to the following
cases:
– v = 0: It means that the current complete binary tree is null, we simply create
a node and associate value v = 0 with the node. The operation returns the
node as CBT.
– v > 0: If the current complete binary tree is a perfect binary tree PBT or it
consists of a single node only, we need to create a virtual binary tree VBT,
which is a copy of the current binary tree. Next, we merge the virtual perfect
binary tree with the original one getting a large perfect binary tree. Finally,
we need to associate the value v with the least virtual leaf (the leftmost
virtual leaf without a value) of the virtual binary tree and set this leaf and
its parents as real. For example, in Fig. 2.(a), v = 4, the nodes with solid line
are real and the nodes with dot line are virtual which can be added later.
Otherwise, we directly associate the value v to the least virtual leaf and set
this leaf and its parents as real 10. In Fig. 2.(b), v = 5.
Note that, in our range queries, we need to parse a normal database DB to its
binary form BDB. First, we need to map keywords of DB to integers in the range
[0, |W |−1], where |W | is the total number of keywords in DB. Next, we construct
a binary tree as described above. The keywords are assigned to the nodes of the
binary tree and are associated with the documents of their descendants. For
9 Note that, we can use TUpdate many times if we need to update more values.
10 Only if its parents were virtual, then we need to convert them to real.
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Algorithm 1 Our Binary Tree
TCon(m)
Input integer m
Output complete binary tree CBT
1: Construct a CBT with dlog(m)e+1 lev-
els.
2: Set the number of leaves to m.
3: Associate the leaves with m consecu-
tive integers [0,m-1] from left to right.
4: return CBT
TAssign(CBT)
Input complete binary tree CBT
Output assigned binary tree ABT
1: Counter c = 0
2: TAssignSub(c, CBT)
3: return ABT
TAssignSub(c, CBT)
Input CBT, counter c
Output Assigned binary tree ABT
1: if CBT.left 6= ⊥ then
2: TAssignSub(c, CBT.left)
3: end if
4: Assign CBT with counter c.
5: c = c+ 1
6: if CBT.right 6= ⊥ then
7: TAssignSub(c, CBT.right)
8: end if
9: Assign CBT with counter c.
10: c = c+ 1
11: return ABT
TGetNodes(n, ABT)
Input node n, ABT
Output NSet
1: NSet ← Empty Set
2: while n 6=⊥ do
3: NSet ← NSet ∪ n
4: n = n.parent
5: end while
6: return NSet
TUpdate(add, v, CBT)
Input op= add, value v, CBT
Output updated CBT
1: if CBT = ⊥ then
2: Create a node.
3: Associate value v = 0 to this node.
4: Set CBT to this node.
5: else if CBT is PBT or CBT has one node
then
6: Create a new root node rootn.
7: Create a VBT = CBT
8: CBT.parent=VBT.parent=rootn
9: CBT = rootn
10: Associate v to the least virtual leaf
and set this leaf and its parents as real.
11: else
12: Execute line 10.
13: end if
14: return CBT
n0 n2
n1
n4 n6
n5
n3
n8 n10
n9
n12 n14
n13
n11
n7
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(a)
n0 n2
n1
n4 n6
n5
n3
n8 n10
n9
n12 n14
n13
n11
n7
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(b)
Fig. 2: Example of Update Operation
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example, In Fig. 1.a, the keywords are {n0, n1, · · · , n6} and BDB(n0) = {f0},
BDB(n1) = {f0, f1, f2, f3}.
4.3 DSSE Range Queries - Construction A
In this section, we apply our new binary tree to the Bost [5] scheme to support
range queries. For performing a ranger query, the client in our scheme first deter-
mine a collection of keywords to cover the requested range. Then, she generates
the search token corresponding to each node (in the cover) and sends them to
the sever, which can be done in a similar way as [5]. Now we are ready to present
the first DSSE scheme that supports range queries and is forward-private. The
scheme is described in Algorithm 2, where F is a cryptographically strong pseu-
dorandom function (PRF), H1 and H2 are keyed hash functions and Π is a
trapdoor permutation.
Setup(1λ): For a security parameter 1λ , the algorithm outputs (TPK, TSK,
K,T,N,m), where TPK and TSK are the public key and secret keys of the trap-
door permutation, respectively, K is the secret key of function F , T, N are maps
and m is the maximum number of the values in our range queries. The map N
is used to store the pair keyword/(STc, c) (current search token and the counter
c, please see Algorithm 2 for more details.) and is kept by the client. The map
T is the encrypted database EDB that used to store the encrypted indices which
is kept by the server.
Search([a, b], σ, m, EDB): The protocol is executed between a client and a server.
The client asks for documents, whose keywords are in the range [a, b], where
0 ≤ a ≤ b < m. The current state of EDB is σ and the integer m describes
the maximum number of values. Note that knowing m, the client can easily
construct the complete binary tree. The server returns a collection of file indices
of requested documents.
Update(add, v, ind, σ, m, EDB): The protocol is performed jointly by a client
and server. The client wishes to add an integer v together with a file index ind
to EDB. The state of EDB is σ, the number of values m. There are following three
cases:
– v < m: The client simply adds ind to the leaf, which contains value v and
its parents (See line 9-24 in Algorithm 2). This is a basic update, which is
similar to the one from [5].
– v = m: The client first updates the complete binary tree to which she adds
the value v. If a new root is added to the new complete binary tree, then the
server needs to add all file indices of the old complete binary tree to the new
one. Finally, the server needs to add ind to the leaf, which contains value v
and its parents.
– v > m: The client uses Update as many times as needed. For simplicity, we
only present the simple case v = m, i.e., the newly added value v equals the
maximum number of values of the current range [0,m−1], in the description
of Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 2 Construction A
Setup(1λ)
Input security parameter 1λ
Output (TPK, TSK,K,T,N,m)
1: K ← {0, 1}λ
2: (TSK, TPK)← TKeyGen(1λ)
3: T, N ← empty map
4: m = 0
5: return (TPK, TSK,K,T,N,m)
Search([a, b], σ, m, EDB)
Client:
Input [a, b], σ, m
Output (Kn, STc, c)
1: CBT ← TCon(m)
2: ABT ← TAssign(CBT)
3: RSet ← Find the minimum nodes to
cover [a, b] in ABT
4: for n ∈ RSet do
5: Kn ← FK(n)
6: (STc, c)← N[n]
7: if (STc, c) 6=⊥ then
8: Send (Kn, STc, c) to the server.
9: end if
10: end for
Server:
Input (Kn, STc, c), EDB
Output (ind)
11: Upon receiving (Kn, STc, c)
12: for i = c to 0 do
13: UTi ← H1(Kn, STi)
14: e← T[UTi]
15: ind← e⊕H2(Kn, STi)
16: Output the ind
17: STi−1 ← Π(TPK, STi)
18: end for
Update(add, v, ind, σ, m, EDB)
Client:
Input add, v, ind, σ, m
Output (UTc+1, e)
1: CBT ← TCon(m)
2: if v = m then
3: CBT←TUpdate(add, v, CBT)
4: m← m+ 1
5: if CBT added a new root then
6: (STc, c)← N[rooto]
7: N[rootn]← (STc, c)
8: end if
9: Get the leaf nv of value v.
10: ABT ← TAssign(CBT)
11: NSet← TGetNodes(nv, ABT)
12: for every node n ∈ NSet do
13: Kn ← FK(n)
14: (STc, c)← N[n]
15: if (STc, c) =⊥ then
16: ST0 ←M, c← −1
17: else
18: STc+1 ← Π−1(TSK, STc)
19: end if
20: N[n]← (STc+1, c+ 1)
21: UTc+1 ← H1(Kn, STc+1)
22: e← ind⊕H2(Kn, STc+1)
23: Send (UTc+1, e) to the Server.
24: end for
25: else if v < m then
26: Execute line 9-24.
27: end if
Server:
Input (UTc+1, e), EDB
Output EDB
28: Upon receiving (UTc+1, e)
29: Set T[UTc+1]← e
The DSSE supports range queries at the cost of large client storage, since the
number of search tokens is linear in the number of all nodes of the current tree
instead of only leaves. In [5], the number of entries at the client is |W |, while it
would be roughly 2|W | in this construction. Moreover, the communication cost
is heavy since the server needs to return all file indices to the client for every
search. To overcome the weakness, we give a new construction with lower client
storage and communication cost in the following section.
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4.4 DSSE Range Queries - Construction B
In this section, we give the second construction by leveraging the Paillier cryp-
tosystem [17] and bit string representation, which significantly reduce the client
storage and communication cost compared with the first one at the cost of los-
ing forward privacy. With the the homomorphic addition property of the Paillier
cryptosystem, we can add and delete the file indices by parsing them into binary
strings, as illustrated in Section 4.2. Next we briefly describe our second DSSE,
which can not only support range queries but also achieve backward privacy.
The scheme is described in Algorithm 3.
Setup(1λ): For a security parameter 1λ , the algorithm returns (PK, SK,K,T,m),
where PK and SK are the public and secret keys of the Paillier cryptosystem,
respectively, K is the secret key of a PRF F , m is the maximum number of values
which can be used to reconstruct the binary tree and the encrypted database
EDB is stored in a map T which is kept by the server.
Search([a, b], σ, m, EDB): The protocol is executed between a client and a server.
The client queries for documents, whose keywords are in the range [a, b], where
0 ≤ a ≤ b < m. σ is the state of EDB, and integer m specifies the maximum
values for our range queries. The server returns encrypted file indices e to the
client, who can decrypt e by using the secret key SK of Pailler Cryptosystem and
obtain the file indices of requested documents.
Update(op, v, ind, σ, m, EDB): The protocol runs between a client and a server.
A requested update is named by the parameter op. The integer v and the file
index ind specifies the tree nodes that need to be updated. The current state σ,
the integer m and the server with input EDB. If op = add, the client generates
a bit string as prescribed in Section 4.2. In case when op = delete, the client
creates the complement bit string as given in Section 4.2. The bit string bs is
encrypted using the Paillier cryptosystem. The encrypted string is denoted by
e. There are following three cases:
– v < m: The client sends the encrypted bit string e with the leaf nv containing
value v and its parents to server. Next the server adds e with the existing
encrypted bit strings corresponding to the nodes specified by the client. See
line 11-23 in Algorithm 3 which is similar to the update in Algorithm 2.
– v = m: The client first updates the complete binary tree to which she adds
the value v. If a new root is added to the new complete binary tree, then the
client retrieves the encrypted bit string of the root (before update). Next the
client adds it to the new root by sending it with the new root to the server.
Finally, the client adds e to the leaf that contains value v and its parents as
in v < m case.
– v > m: The client uses Update as many times as needed. For simplicity,
we only consider v = m, where m is the number of values in the maximum
range.
In this construction, it achieves backward privacy. Moreover, the communication
overhead between the client and the server is significantly reduced due to the
fact that for each query, the server returns a single ciphertext to the client at the
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Algorithm 3 Construction B
Setup(1λ)
Input security parameter 1λ
Output (PK, SK,K,T,m)
1: K ← {0, 1}λ
2: (SK, PK)← KeyGen(1λ)
3: T ← empty map
4: m = 0
5: return (PK, SK,K,T,m)
Search([a, b], σ, m, EDB)
Client:
Input [a, b], σ,m
Output (UTn)
1: CBT ← TCon(m)
2: ABT ← TAssign(CBT)
3: RSet ← Find the minimum nodes to
cover [a, b] in ABT
4: for n ∈ RSet do
5: UTn ← FK(n)
6: Send UTn to the server.
7: end for
Server:
Input (UTn), EDB
Output (e)
8: Upon receiving UTn
9: e← T[UTn]
10: Send e to the Client.
Update(op, v, ind, σ, m, EDB)
Client:
Input op, v, ind, σ,m
Output (UTn, e)
1: CBT ← TCon(m)
2: if v = m then
3: CBT ← TUpdate(add, v, CBT)
4: m← m+ 1
5: if CBT added a new root then
6: UTrooto ← FK(rooto)
7: UTrootn ← FK(rootn)
8: e← T[UTrooto ]
9: T[UTrootn ]← e
10: end if
11: Get the leaf nv of value v.
12: ABT ← TAssign(CBT)
13: NSet← TGetNodes(nv, ABT)
14: if op = add then
15: Generate the bit string bs as
state in Bit String Representation of
Section 4.2.
16: else if op = del then
17: Generate the complement bit
string bs as state in Bit String Rep-
resentation of Section 4.2.
18: end if
19: for every node n ∈ NSet do
20: UTn ← FK(n)
21: e← Enc(PK, bs)
22: Send (UTn, e) to the server.
23: end for
24: else if v < m then
25: Execute line 11-23.
26: end if
Server:
Input (UTn, e), EDB
Output EDB
1: Upon receiving (UTn, e)
2: e′ ← T[UTn]
3: if e′ 6=⊥ then
4: e← e · e′
5: end if
6: T[UTn]← e
cost of supporting small number of documents. Since, in Paillier cryptosystem,
the length of the message is usually small and fixed (e.g. 1024 bits).
This construction can be applied to applications, where the number of doc-
uments is small and simultaneously the number of keywords can be large. The
reason for this is the fact that for a given keyword, the number of documents
which contain it is small. Consider a temperature forecast system that uses a
database, which stores records from different sensors (IoT) located in different
cities across Australia. In the application, the cities (sensors) can be considered
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as documents and temperature measurements can be considered as the keywords.
For example, Sydney and Melbourne have the temperature of 18◦C. Adelaide
and Wollongong have got 17◦C and 15◦C, respectively. If we query for cities,
whose temperature measurements are in the range from 17 to 18◦C, then the
outcome includes Adelaide, Sydney and Melbourne. Here, the number of cities
(documents) is not large. The number of different temperature measurements
(keywords) can be large depending on requested precision.
5 Security Analysis
Similar to [13], for a range query q = [a, b], let {nc1 , ..., nct} be the tree cover
of interval [a, b]. We consider nci as a keyword and parse a range query into
several keywords. Before define the leakage functions, we define a search query
q = (t, [a, b]) = {(t, nc1), · · · , (t, nct)}. For an update query, if we want to up-
date a file ind with value v, we may need to update the corresponding leaf
node and its parents in the tree denoted as {nu1 , · · · , nut}. We define an up-
date query u = (t, op, (v, ind)) = {(t, op, (nu1 , ind)), · · · , (t, op, (nut , ind))}. For
a list of search query Q = {(t, n) : (t, n) ∈ {q}} and a list of update query
Q′ = {(t, op, (n, ind)) : (t, op, (n, ind)) ∈ {u}} Then, following [5], the leakage to
the server is summarized as follows:
– Search pattern sp(n) = {t : (t, n) ∈ Q}, it leaks the timestamp t that the
same search query on n.
– History Hist(n) = {(t, op, ind) : (t, op, (n, ind)) ∈ Q′}, the history of key-
word n. It includes all the updates made to DB(n) and when the update
happened.
– contain pattern cp(n) = {t′ : DB(n) ⊆ DB(n′) and t′ < t, (t′, n′), (t, n) ∈ Q},
it leaks the time t′ of previous search query on keyword n′, where DB(n) ⊆
DB(n′). Note that, cp(n) is an inherited leakage for range queries when the
file indices are revealed to the server. If a query n is a subrange of query n′,
then the file index set for n will also be a subset of the file index set for n′.
5.1 Forward Privacy
Following [5], forward privacy means that an update does not leak any infor-
mation about keywords of updated documents matching a query we previously
issued. A formal definition is given below:
Definition 2. ([5]) A L-adaptively-secure DSSE scheme Γ is forward-private if
the update leakage function LUpdt can be written as
LUpdt(op, in) = L′(op, (indi, µi))
where (indi, µi) is the set of modified documents paired with number µi of mod-
ified keywords for the updated document indi.
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5.2 Construction A
Since the first DSSE construction is based on [5], it inherits security of the
original design. Adaptive security of the construction A can be proven in the
Random Oracle Model and is a modification of the security proof of [5]. We refer
readers to Appendix for the full proof.
Theorem 1. (Adaptive forward privacy of A). Let LΓA = (LSrchΓA , LUpdtΓA ), where
LSrchΓA (n) = (sp(n), Hist(n), cp(n)), LUpdtΓA (add, n, ind) =⊥. The construction A
is LΓA-adaptively forward-private.
Compared with [5], this construction additionally leaks the contain pattern
cp as described in Section 3.1. Other leakages are exactly the same as [5]. Since
the server executes one keyword search and update one keyword/file-index pair
at a time. Note that the server does not know the secret key of the trapdoor
permutation, so it cannot learn anything about the pair even if the keyword has
been searched by the client previously.
5.3 Backward Privacy
Backward privacy means that a search query on keyword n does not leak the
file indices that previously added and later deleted. More formally, we modify
the Type I definition of [6]. It leaks keyword n has been updated11, the total
number of updates on n. More formally,
Definition 3. A L-adaptively-secure DSSE scheme Γ is backward-private if
the the search and update leakage functions LSrch, LUpdt can be written as
LUpdt(n) = L′(n), LSrch = L′′(sp(n)).
5.4 Construction B
The adaptive security of second DSSE construction relies on the semantic secu-
rity of Paillier cryptosystem. All file indices are encrypted using the public key of
Paillier cryptosystem. Without the secret key, the server cannot learn anything
from the ciphertext. Note that, during update, this construction leaks which
keyword has been updated. We refer readers to Appendix for the full proof.
Theorem 2. (Adaptive backward privacy of B). Let LΓB = (LSrchΓB , LUpdtΓB ),
where LSrchΓB (n) = (sp(n)), LUpdtΓB (op, n, ind) = (n). Construction B is LΓB -
adaptively backward-private.
During the update, the construction B leaks which keyword has been up-
dated. However, it does not leak the type of update (either add or del) on
encrypted file indices, because both addition and deletion are achieved by ho-
momorphic addition. Moreover, it does not leak contain pattern cp and the file
indices that previously added and later deleted since the file indices have been
encrypted, and the server can learn nothing without the secret key.
11 Instead of leaking the keyword n in the plaintext form, it may be leaked in the
masked form.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we give two secure DSSE schemes that support range queries.
The first DSSE construction applies our binary tree to Bost [5]’s framework
which achieves forward privacy. However, it incurs a large storage overhead in
the client and a large communication cost between the client and the server. To
achieve backward privacy, we propose the second DSSE construction with range
queries by applying Paillier cryptosystem and bit string representation. In this
construction, we use the fixed update token to reduce the client and the server
storage at the cost of losing forward privacy. In addition, it can not support large
number of documents. Although the second DSSE construction cannot support
large number of documents, it can still be very useful in certain applications. In
the future, we would like to construct more scalable DSSE schemes with more
expressive queries.
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Appendix
Theorem 1. Let Π be the one-way trapdoor permutation, F be a PRF, and
H1, H2 be the hash functions and manipulated as random oracles outputting λ
bits. Define LΓA = (LSrchΓA , LUpdtΓA ), where LSrchΓA (n) = (sp(n), Hist(n), cp(n)),
LUpdtΓA (add, n, ind) =⊥. Construction A is LΓA-adaptively forward-private.
Proof. As mentioned before, we parse a range interval into several keywords. Fol-
lowing [5], we will set a serial of games from DSSEREALΓAA (1
λ) to DSSEIDEALΓAA,S1(1
λ).
Game G1,0: G1,0 is exactly same as the real world game DSSEREAL
ΓA
A (1
λ).
Pr[DSSEREALΓAA (1
λ) = 1] = Pr[G1,0 = 1].
Game G1,1: Instead of calling F when generating kn, G1,1 picks a new ran-
dom key when it inputs a new keyword n, and stores it in a table Key so it can
be reused next time. If an adversary A is able to distinguish between G1,0 and
G1,1, we can then build a reduction to distinguish between F and a truly random
function. More formally, there exists an efficient adversary B1 such that
Pr[G1,0 = 1]− Pr[G1,1 = 1] ≤ AdvprfF,B1(λ).
Game G1,2: In G1,2, we pick random strings in replace of calling hash func-
tion H1, where H1 is modeled as a random oracle. For every search, the output
of H1 is programmed where H1(Kn, STc(n)) = UT[n, c].
Algorithm 4 describes this game and introduce an intermediate game G′1,2.
G′1,2 is used to keep the consistency of H1’s transcript. In Update, we chooses
a random value for UTc(n) and stores it in table UT, and programed it to the
output of (Kn, STc) in Search.
Since H1’s outputs in G
′
1,2 and G1,1 are perfectly indistinguishable, so we
have
Pr[G1,1 = 1] = Pr[G
′
1,2 = 1].
G′1,2 and G1,2 are also perfectly identical unless the bad happens (set to true).
Pr[G′1,2 = 1]− Pr[G1,2 = 1] ≤ Pr[bad is set to true in G′1,2]
Following [5], the possibility for H1(Kn, STc+1) already exists is the advan-
tage of breaking the one-wayness of the trapdoor permutation which is AdvOWΠ,B2(1
λ).
Assume the query make N queries, then we have
Pr[G1,1 = 1]− Pr[G1,2 = 1] = Pr[G′1,2 = 1]− Pr[G1,2 = 1] ≤ N · AdvOWΠ,B2(1λ).
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Algorithm 4 Game G1,2 and single box for G
′
1,2
Setup(1λ)
1: (TSK, TPK)← TKeyGen(1λ)
2: T, N ← empty map
3: m = 0
4: bad← false
5: return (TPK, TSK,K,T,N,m)
Search([a, b], σ; m, EDB)
Client:
1: CBT ← TCon(m)
2: ABT ← TAssign(CBT)
3: RSet ← TGetCover([a, b], ABT)
4: for n ∈ RSet do
5: Kn ← Key(n)
6: (ST0, · · · , STc, c)← N[n]
7: if (STc, c) 6=⊥ then
8: for i = 0 to c do
9: H1(Kn, STi)← UT[n, i]
10: end for
11: Send (Kn, STc, c) to the server.
12: end if
13: end for
Server:
14: Upon receiving (Kn, STc, c)
15: for i = c to 0 do
16: UTi ← H1(Kn, STi)
17: e← T[UTi]
18: ind← e⊕H2(Kn, STi)
19: Output the ind
20: STi−1 ← Π(TPK, STi)
21: end for
Update(add, v, ind, σ; m, EDB)
Client:
1: CBT ← TCon(m)
2: if v = m then
3: CBT←TUpdate(add, v, CBT)
4: m← m+ 1
5: if CBT added a new root then
6: (STc, c)← N[rootold]
7: N[rootnew]← (STc, c)
8: end if
9: Get the leaf nv of value v.
10: ABT ← TAssign(CBT)
11: NSet← TGetNodes(nv, ABT)
12: for every node n ∈ NSet do
13: Kn ← Key(n)
14: (STc, c)← N[n]
15: if (STc, c) =⊥ then
16: ST0 ←M, c← −1
17: else
18: STc+1 ← Π−1(TSK, STc)
19: end if
20: N[n]← (ST0, · · · , STc+1, c+ 1)
21: UTc+1 ← {0, 1}x
22: if H1(Kn, STc+1 6=⊥) then
23: bad← true, UTc+1 ← H1(Kn, STc+1)
24: end if
25: UT[n, c+ 1]← UTc+1
26: e← ind⊕H2(Kn, STc+1)
27: Send (UTc+1, e) to the Server.
28: end for
29: else if v < m then
30: Execute line 9-24.
31: else
32: We can use Update many times.
33: end if
Server:
34: Upon receiving (UTc+1, e)
35: Set T[UTc+1]← e
H1(k, v)
1: v′ ← H1(k, v)
2: if v′ =⊥ then
3: v′ ← {0, 1}x
4: if ∃n, c s.t v = STc ∈ N[n] then
5: bad← true, v′ ← UT [n, c]
6: end if
7: H1(k, v)← v′
8: end if
9: return v′
Game G1,3: Similar to G1,2, G1,3 programs H2. The same steps can be
reused, giving that there is an adversary B3, such that
Pr[G1,2 = 1]− Pr[G1,3 = 1] ≤ N · AdvOWΠ,B3(1λ).
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Note that, we can consider B2 = B3 without loss of generality.
Game G1,4: In G1,4, we keep the records of the random generated encrypted
strings of the H1 and H2. In Update, we choose random values for update
tokens and ciphertexts in Table UT and e, respectively. Then we program them
identically to the outputs of the corresponding hash functions in Search. Then
G1,4 is exactly same as the G1,3. More formally,
Pr[G1,4 = 1] = Pr[G1,3 = 1]
Algorithm 5 Simulator S1
S.Setup(1λ)
1: (TSK, TPK)← TKeyGen(1λ)
2: N, T ← empty map
3: t = 0
4: return (TPK, TSK,T,N)
S.Update()
Client:
1: UT[t]← {0, 1}x
2: e[t]← {0, 1}y
3: Send (UT[t], e[t]) to the server.
4: t← t+ 1
S.Search(sp(n), Hist(n), cp(n))
Client:
1: nˆ← min sp(n)
2: Knˆ ← Key[nˆ]
3: Parse cp(n) as t′
4: if t′ 6=⊥ then
5: Get the c-th search token STc of
previously queried keyword at time t′.
6: else
7: Parse Hist(n) as ((t0, add, ind0),
· · · , (tc, add, indc))
8: if Hist(n) =⊥ then
9: return ∅
10: end if
11: for i = 0 to c do
12: Set H1(Knˆ, STi)← UT[ti]
13: Set H2(Knˆ, STi)← e[ti]⊕ indi
14: STi+1 ← Π−1TSK(STi)
15: end for
16: end if
17: Send (Knˆ, STc) to the server.
Simulator S1 With the contain pattern cp, the simulator can reuse the
certain update token UT to simulate the inclusion relationship between the
keywords. We can use the search pattern nˆ ← min sp(n) and history Hist to
simulate the Search and Update. Similar to [5], we have
Pr[G1,4 = 1] = Pr[DSSEIDEAL
ΓA
A,S1(1
λ) = 1]
Finally,
Pr[DSSEREALΓAA (1
λ) = 1]− Pr[DSSEIDEALΓAA,S1(1λ) = 1]
≤ AdvprfF,B1(1λ) + 2N · AdvOWΠ,B2(1λ)
which completes the proof. 
Theorem 2. Let F be a PRF, and Σ be a IND-CPA secure Paillier cryptosys-
tem. LΓB = (LSrchΓB , LUpdtΓB ), where LSrchΓB (n) = (sp(n)), L
Updt
ΓB
(op, n, ind) = (n).
Construction B is LΓB -adaptively backward-private.
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Proof. For Theorem 2, we also set a serial of games from DSSEREALΓBA (1
λ) to
DSSEIDEALΓBA,S2(1
λ).
Game G2,0: G2,0 is exactly same as the real world game DSSEREAL
ΓB
A (1
λ).
Pr[DSSEREALΓBA (1
λ) = 1] = Pr[G2,0 = 1]
Game G2,1: Instead of calling F when generating UTn, G2,1 picks a new
random key when it inputs a new keyword n, and stores it in a table Key so it
can be reused next time. If an adversary A is able to distinguish between G2,0
and G2,1, we can then build a reduction able to distinguish between F and a
truly random function. More formally, there exists an efficient adversary B1 such
that
Pr[G2,0 = 1]− Pr[G2,1 = 1] ≤ AdvprfF,B1(1λ).
GameG2,2: We replace the bit string bs with a all 0 bit string. If an adversary
A is able to distinguish between G2,1 and G2,2, we can then build an adversary
B2 to break the semantic security of Paillier cryptosystem. More formally, there
exists an efficient adversary B2 such that
Pr[G2,1 = 1]− Pr[G2,2 = 1] ≤ AdvIND-CPAΣ,B2 (1λ).
Algorithm 6 Simulator S2
S.Setup(1λ)
1: (SK, PK)← KeyGen(1λ)
2: return (PK, SK, t)
S.Update(n)
Client:
1: UTn ← Key(n)
2: e← Enc(PK, 0 · · · 0)
3: Send (UTn, e) to the server.
S.Search(sp(n))
Client:
1: nˆ← min sp(n)
2: UTnˆ ← Key(nˆ)
3: Send UTnˆ to the server.
Simulator Now, we can simulator the DSSEIDEAL with the leakage functions
defined in this Theorem. We removed the useless part which will not influence
the client’s transcript. See Algorithm 6 for more details. This two games is
indistinguishable. So we have
Pr[G2,2 = 1] = Pr[DSSEIDEAL
ΓB
A,S2(1
λ) = 1]
Finally,
Pr[DSSEREALΓBA (1
λ) = 1]− Pr[DSSEIDEALΓBA,S2(1λ) = 1]
≤ AdvprfF,B1(1λ) + AdvIND-CPAΣ,B2 (1λ)
which completes the proof. 
